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Dangerous times implicitly authorize state violence and the use of a range of tactics to manage
danger, restore order and protect the safety of the state and its citizens. National unity is called for, if
not, demanded, and dissenters are excised as part of “them,” not “us.” To dissent is to collaborate with
those who pose a danger to the state and its people. Almost inevitably the tactics of governance during
dangerous times include the management of dissent.
Ordinarily, dissent is reactive in nature. The state assumes a posture in response to danger, and
someone or a group of someones stand up and declare: “not in my name, not in our names.” In this
sense, the dissenting subject emerges out of resistence to the exercise of political power. Whilst the
state is actively involved in manufacturing consent to its policies, the dissenter is hard at work
undermining or resisting those very policies. Thus, while the dissenter is an epiphenomenon of
government action, he or she is not integral to the state’s aims, indeed, the dissenter’s subjectivity
develops beyond the political horizon set by the state.
Dissent becomes a different, and in some ways more interesting, phenomenon when the
dissenter emerges not from outside the political horizon drawn by the state, but rather from within it,
and as an integral part of the state’s project of governance. In these cases, the state calls up a set of
subjects who are in some fundamental sense positioned to gain state, if not public, disfavor. These
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subjects are then isolated, excised or otherwise managed in ways that further state interests. These
Others, having had a subjectivity crafted for them by the state - usually by law - find themselves both
assuming a marginalized identity and dissenting from government regulation or discipline in ways that are
worth marking as different from that of the more common political dissenter. These outlaws, once
marginalized, can be useful to state actors in managing periods of stress to the state, or dangerous
times. In dangerous times, as in all other times, governance necessarily includes the creation of a range
of governable subjects. In this essay, I discuss several circumstances in which the production of sexual
outlaws proves to be a convenient method of managing periods of public, if not state, stress.
Even in periods when a nation can be understood to be taking significant steps toward
expanding freedom, when fundamental reforms are undertaken to materialize a break with a prior
ignoble regime, and when the story of a nation conforms to a liberal narrative of progress away from
unfreedom and toward greater autonomy and equality, we can see the state anxiously managing stress
and deploying technologies of governance that inscribe certain types of governable subjects and then
disciplining their dissent.
We all know by now that sex is an especially dense transfer point for power.1 Dangerous
times teach us how these transfer points become key to the exercise of state power and control. In this
essay, I examine how sex and sexuality can be used by the state during significant moments of
transition, as well as periods of state formation and reformation, both in identifying danger and as a
tactic of governance. In this essay I examine three instances when sex and sexuality have been

1

Michel Foucault, The History of Sexuality Volume 1: An Introduction, (New York: Vintage
Books, 1990), p. 103.
-3-

particularly useful to the project of managing political instability or transition. These examples illustrate
how under some circumstances, in response to transitional stress, the state gains an official sexuality,
sources of threat are sexualized, and the management of sex becomes a tool of governance that
produces individual unfreedom in the name of expanding national freedom or independence. In each of
these examples, an antagonism is set up between the interests of the nation and those of the outlaw,
who ultimately assumes the role of dissenter. When set up in this manner, the singular must yield to the
many.
First, I look at the sexual politics of rule of President Robert Mugabe in Zimbabwe. Mugabe
has found the deployment of sex as a particularly useful wedge issue in his mission of national freedom that is, freedom from colonial rule by the British. Mugabe has effectively undertaken brutally
homophobic policies by framing them within a post colonial story that has enormous purchase with his
people. Yet driving this deployment of a homophobic anti-imperialist progrom has been a shrewd plan
to disempower a rapidly growing civil society in Zimbabwe. Mugabe’s repressive campaigns attacking
homosexuals have supported an ever radiating set of attacks against women, political opponents and
white farmers. One way to read this trajectory is to see that the assault on homosexuality was the entry
point in the creation of a culture of intolerance. Here, as elsewhere, sex has been looked to as a
particularly useful transfer point for the consolidation of post colonial power.
Next I turn to Egypt and recent government-led campaigns of highly public and publicized
criminal prosecutions of men alleged to be gay. It is tempting to read these public spectacles as events
similar to those being undertaken in east African nations: the Egyptian government bluntly demonstrating
its Islamic credentials to a domestic and pan Arab audience, and in so doing, consolidating its own
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power. Yet, closer examination reveals that these show trials emerged as part of an ongoing post
colonial struggle within Egypt that began in the 1930s with the repeal of British colonial laws licensing
prostitution. Against this history, a set of homosexual social and legal subjects have been created by
the Mubarak government, and once so formed and disciplined, “human rights” rides into the rescue to
liberate these perversely formed dissenters from social and legal discipline. The (invited?) assistance of
the international human rights establishment has further reinforced post colonial nationalist rhetoric that
located individual rights as a Western norm that threatens to undermine authentic African culture.
Finally, I turn to the United States in the period immediately following the civil war, when the
federal government undertook two enormously challenging tasks: reunifying the nation after a
devastating civil war, and managing the transition of African Americans from enslavement to citizenship.
Having identified itself with the fundamental values of freedom and equality, in contradistinction to the
vanquished confederate states, the federal government demonstrated its commitment to these values in
and through the way it managed the project of civilizing freed men and women. Remarkably, however,
the practices of freedom undertaken by the federal government in the immediate post war period were
focused, not entirely, but quite prominently, on the regulation of freed men and women’s sexual
practices. A long-denied right to marry was awarded to African Americans immediately upon
emancipation, however this new domain of freedom was soon revealed to be more a test administered
by the state than a trump to be wielded against state infringement of individual autonomy. Successful
participation in and compliance with the rules of the institution of marriage were the grounds upon which
freed men and women were to prove that they deserved to be treated as citizens.
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Thus the containment of freedmen’s sexuality into marriage, a “space of regulated freedom,”2
became one of the principle techniques of governance used by the U.S. government, to create
particularly governable subjects.3
George Mosse, Ann Stoler and others have observed a productive, if not reproductive,
relationship between sexuality and nationalism.4 Stoler has noted that “the distinction between
normality and abnormality, between bourgeois respectability and sexual deviance, and between moral
degeneracy and eugenic cleansing were the elements of a discourse that made unconventional sex a
national threat and thus put a premium on managed sexuality for the health of the state.”5 My project
here is to illuminate not only the validity of this observation, but also the circumstances under which a
form of state-sponsored biopolitics calls up unconventionally sexed subjects in the service of managing
stress to the state. Thus, sex can be usefully put to work, as I have discussed elsewhere, i) as a

2

Nikolas Rose, Powers of Freedom (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), p. 22.

3

An essay plumbing the relationship between nationalism and sexuality in the United States
could surely look to the persecution of homosexuality during the 1950's. I chose, instead, to focus on
the late 19th century and the experiences of African Americans largely because their experiences have
been underdocumented, and I saw little benefit in rehearsing the very good work already done by
others on the homophobia of the McCarthy period. See e.g. John D'Emilio, “The Homosexual Menace:
The Politics of Sexuality in Cold War America,” in Making Trouble: Essays on Gay History, Politics,
and the University (New York: Routledge, 1989).
4

George L. Mosse, Nationalism and Sexuality: Middle-Class Morality and Sexual Norms in
Modern Europe (Madison, WI: University of Wisconsin Press, 1985); Ann Laura Stoler, Race and the
Education of Desire: Foucault’s History of Sexuality and the Colonial Order of Things (Durham, NC:
Duke University Press, 1995); Andrew Parker, Mary Russo, Doris Sommer and Patricia Yaeger eds.,
Nationalisms & Sexualities (New York: Routledge, 1992).
5

Stoler, Race and the Education of Desire, p. 34, referencing the work of Mosse, Nationalism
and Sexuality.
-6-

wedge issue that introduces a climate of intolerance by a state seeking to frustrate the growth of civil
society (Zimbabwe); ii) as a structural component of post-colonial nation building (Egypt); or iii) to
control and subordinate a population even when undertaken in the name of freedom for that same
population (freed men and women in U.S. reconstruction). These sexual outlaws then find themselves
both positioned as and drawn to the role of dissenter - resisting the process by which their subjugation
has rendered them internal enemies of the state.
Comparative work of this kind always poses the risk of over-simplifying complex social
histories and genealogies, if not worse, skimming to achieve coherence across cultures and times. I do
not profess to be a scholar of either of the two non-U.S. examples I provide here, others are far more
familiar with the double histories of nationalism and sexuality in Egypt6 and Zimbabwe7. I offer this
comparative analysis for the limited purpose of illuminating how at key moments, and in three very
different sites, the nation is imagined is ways that depend upon an interesting interdependence between
national and sexual alterity.

I. Disciplinary Administration of African National Sexual Citizenship in Post
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Colonial Zimbabwe
Benedict Anderson regards nationalism as best understood as more similar to kinship or religion
than liberalism or fascism.8 Surely this is true of Robert Mugabe’s approach to nation building in post
colonial Zimbabwe. Mugabe has sold to his people a notion of an independent and sovereign
Zimbabwe that has rested upon the idea of indigenization, yet where some people are more indigenous
than others.9 While this is not an uncommon post colonial nation-building strategy, Mugabe has
undertaken such a task in a manner that explicitly constructs “national identity not on the basis of its
own intrinsic properties but as a function of what it (presumably) is not. Implying ‘some element of
alterity for its definition,’ a nation ineluctably ‘shaped by what is opposes.’”10 The difference against
which Mugabe has constituted Zimbabwean kinship and nationalism has been, of course, racial in
nature, but more than any sub-Saharan post colonial leader, Mugabe has used sexuality to consolidate
power in a post-colonial regime threatened both extraterritorially by the likes of the World Bank, and
domestically by expanding institutions of civil society.
In Zimbabwe, formerly Rhodesia, a white majority government declared independence from
Britain in 1965, and whites grabbed the most valuable resources in the country, leaving blacks to
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struggle in extreme poverty on unproductive land. A protracted war for liberation ensued in which land
redistribution was one of the central issues. In 1980 the British helped broker a resolution to the war for
liberation from white rule, and when elections were held, Robert Mugabe, leader of the Zimbabwe
African National Union-Patriotic Front (Zanu-PF), the dominant liberation movement, won a
resounding victory.11
For a short while Mugabe’s government held out hope of offering the Zimbabwian people a
peaceful and relatively prosperous transition away from British rule to independence. Promising
reconciliation with the white Rhodesians who remained in the country after the elections, Mugabe
initially reached out to the former white leadership in a manner that caught most white elites by surprise.
Yet, after 18 months, Mugabe declared that “the honeymoon is over” and he unleashed vicious attacks
against whites as well as his political competition.12 Ongoing attacks against Mugabe from South Africa
on account of his Marxist politics, and the adoption of an Economic Structural Adjustment Program
(ESAP) in 1991 led to increases in interest rates and inflation, which problems were compounded by
drought in 1992 and 1995. Land reform was not integrated into the ESAP, while large scale
commercial farmers were the principal beneficiaries of reforms promoting agricultural exports. The
stock market fell and manufacturing contracted by 40 percent between 1992 and 1996. By 1997, the
Mugabe government was faced with a serious economic and political crisis, with attendant public
strikes, increased violence and increasing demands to wrest control of the most productive land from
white former Rhodesians who had been grandfathered out of land reform in the 1980 settlement
11
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brokered by the British. 13
While Mugabe had always used racial and political differences to establish the authenticity and
authority of his government, in 1995 he nominated a new threat to the identity of integrity of
Zimbabwean society: homosexuality. Against a backdrop of escalating political, social and economic
chaos, in 1995 Mugabe began a public campaign against lesbians and gay men, actively encouraging
the national press to report negatively on issues relating to homosexuality, and speaking out himself in
ways that invited violence against gay men and lesbians.14 That year he ordered the Zimbabwe
International Book Fair to ban an exhibit by the civil rights group, Gays & Lesbians of Zimbabwe.
Lesbians and gay men were "sexual perverts" who are "lower than dogs and pigs", claimed Mugabe.
He warned homosexuals to leave the country "voluntarily" or face "dire consequences." Soon
afterwards, Mugabe urged the public to track down and arrest lesbians and gay men. Since these
incitements, men and women perceived to be gay or lesbian have been beaten up, fire-bombed,
arrested, interrogated and threatened with death. 15 Mugabe justified these remarks on the ground that
homosexuality is "un-African", describing it as "coming from so-called developed nations," labelling
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homosexuality "a white problem." Surely, none of his domestic or international troubles could be traced
back to same-sex sexual practices, yet Mugabe devoted considerable time and vitriol to the “problem”
of gay people in Zimbabwe, and many observers, both domestically and internationally, held the view
that Mugabe unleashed such homophobic vitriol as a way to distract attention away from the
government’s growing economic and political problems. Of course, the growth in visibility of lesbians
and gays in Zimbabwe in the mid-1990s provides some explanation for why Mugabe chose this group
at this time to vilify in such a public way.
What is more, the aggressive imposition, if not, invention of traditional and authentic
Zimbabwean culture through the assertion of heterosexuality arose at a time in which Zimbabwe had
lost a normative antipodal anchor against which it had asserted its own superior identity: Apartheid
South Africa. Prior to 1991, “not only did the apartheid government provide Zimbabwe with an
external military, economic and political threat on which to focus, but it presented the Zimbabwean
government with a moral high ground easily occupied. Both of these factors provided a moral-political
impetus and a certain cohesion to government and society in a newly liberated Zimbabwe, as well as
sometimes excusing or distracting from internal problems.”16 The dissolution of apartheid in
Zimbabwe’s neighbor to the south withdrew the specter of an evil empire with which to contrast
Mugabe’s civic, African and political virtue.
By the mid 1990's, members of the ruling ZANU PF party in parliament spoke out against "the
evil and iniquitous practice of homosexualism and lesbianism." One party member declared, "I would
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like to call for all traditional forces in this country to rally behind the State President in the eradication of
homosexualism. I feel that all those who know homos in this country should make them be brought
before the courts of law and be tried for their evil activity." Border Gezi, the governor of Mashonaland
Central Province, declared that gays and lesbians have "something wrong in their heads" and that
homosexuality is completely alien to Zimbabwean culture. "They have no right to practice homosexuality
in our country," he says. "If they don't like it, they can leave."17 To cap it all off, in 1998, the Mugabe
government successfully prosecuted the former President Canaan Banana for sodomy.
Of course, Mugabe’s assertion of authentic African heterosexuality dissolves under the slightest
pressure. Not only was there a broad array of same sex sexual practices between men in the precolonial period,18 but the notion that human beings possessed a sexuality, such that it could be
organized into homo and hetero sexualities, was itself an artifact of British colonial rule.19 Prior to the
civilizing missions of the colonial occupation in Rhodesia, human sexuality was understood in
reproductive terms that were constitutive of kinship networks and familial wealth. The reproduction of
patrilineal order was the organizing force behind human sexuality, not sexual identity of object choice
framed in terms of desire. “What was important was consequential physical activity rather than
projected cognitive desire.”20 Thus, the Mugabe government’s assertion of an authentic, pre-colonial
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African sexuality presupposes an approach to sexuality that has no African roots, and the campaign
against gay people in Zimbabwe was undertaken, in significant part, through the enforcement of, if not
merely reference to, laws criminalizing homosexuality that had been enacted by the British during
colonial rule.21
While homo sex existed in Zimbabwe prior to Mugabe’s strategic interpellation of a gay threat,
“he has introduced the word and concept of a ‘sexuality’ into a previously virginal public discourse; he
has been a virulent propagandist for the whole concept of a binary division, where those boundaries
were previously blurred. This is not to suggest that Zimbabwe is now flooded with self-identified samesex lovers – it is simply to suggest that he has participated in the constitution of a new identity – one that
is individualised, sexualised, and in this form, historically marginalised. Further, by publicising his
homophobia President Mugabe has given an identity to many who were previously ignorant of or
uncaring about it.”22 Most significant, for present purposes, Mugabe has creating a constituency of
marginalized dissenters who have looked to international human rights as a source of protection from
government policies. GALZ’s claims that its members should enjoy a right to protection against sexual
orientation-based discrimination has been put to good use by Mugabe, who has used nationalism to
frame the interests of Zimbabwean people, in contrast to the “individual freedom” of perverts and
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sodomists.23 The rights of the singular must yield to the interests of the collectivity.
Human rights activists have critiqued the Mugabe government’s attacks on homosexuality as a
means to distract attention away from the nation’s political and economic problems. So too, this
campaign has been interpreted through a post colonial lens, playing to black Zimbabweans’ notions of
authentic African sexuality and identifying gayness with other imperialist threats in the form of the World
Bank, white landowners and other Rhodesian residue. The perversity of the way in which
homosexuality has been used by Mugabe in connection with his larger political projects is no better
exemplified than his accusation that the British Government had set "gay gangsters" on him over his land
reforms.24 Mugabe thus sets himself up as a besieged African leader being undermined by the (gay)
hand of a prior colonial power, while he tries to restore land to his black (male) constituents. Mugabe
has effectively turned to sexuality to produce a normal heterosexual citizen set off against a gay threat to
Zimbabwean society in such a way that “‘relations of subjugation can produce subjects,’ defined by
their varied transgressions as “internal enemies’ of society and state.”25 These internal enemies have
served as the antipodal point against which Mugabe’s Zimbabwe can define itself by reference to what
it is not.
In some ways, what concerns human rights workers the most is the dexterity with which
Mugabe has used the attacks on gay people as a stepping stone for broader attacks on his rivals and
23
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for consolidating his dwindling power. Mugabe correctly anticipated that the human rights community in
Zimbabwe would not respond to the attacks on gay men and lesbians, indeed, many did not regard this
as a human rights issue at all. Having met scant opposition to his policies attacking lesbians and gays,
Mugabe moved on to gain further political advantage by undermining women’s rights. Given how
fundamental land distribution and redistribution is to Zimbabwean politics, particularly to supporters of
the ruling ZANU PF party, Mugabe undertook several of land reform policies that explicitly
disempowered women. In 1998 the minister in charge of resettlement, Joseph Msika, rejected
women's demands for land permits to be automatically registered in the name of both spouses, and for
the five million hectares earmarked for redistribution to be given to single, unmarried women or women
heads of households. He justified these policies on the ground that granting women land rights would
create domestic (household) unrest.26
The government’s policies on women and land ownership operationalized what had been long
standing informal policy with respect to women’s rights claims in Zimbabwe. Shortly after the Supreme
Court held in the 1984 Katekwe case27 that seduction damages (or loss of lobola or bride price) was a
legal asset owned by the seduced female, not her male guardian, Mugabe joked in Parliament “that if
his sister were to get married, he would demand lobola and if the intended husband pointed to the
Katekwe judgement, he would say to him, ‘O.K. That is the judgement. Do you want to marry my

26

Zimbabwe Women Fight to Put Gender on the Land Agenda, The Guardian, January 6,

27

Katekwe v. Muchabaiwa 1984 (2) ZLR 112 (S).

1999.

-15-

sister or not?’”28
The government’s official use of women as a wedge issue in land policy gained juridical power
after Mugabe packed the Supreme Court with his supporters in 1999.29 Immediately thereafter, the
Supreme Court ruled on a woman’s claim to a right to inherit her father’s property after her half brother
evicted her from her deceased father’s house. The Court unanimously rejected her claim on the ground
that the "nature of African society" dictates that women are not equal to men, especially in family
relationships. Under customary law, only men can inherit and all family members are subordinate to the
male head of the family. “Women should never be considered adults within the family, but only as a
junior male or teenager.”30 The court carefully framed its ruling as necessarily driven by the customary
law of the tribe in which the deceased father had been a member, and tersely dismissed domestic laws
and international treaties that required sex equality as imposing colonial, not indigenous, law and norms
on the Zimbabwean people.31 The ruling resulted in fifty-eight year old Venia Magaya being evicted
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from her home by her father’s second wife’s son, and it has had devastating implications for women in
Zimbabwe given that 70 per cent of the agricultural labor force in Zimbabwe are women who work on
the soil but cannot own land in their own right.
Mugabe moved on from there when he invited violence against his political opposition,32
supported extrajudicial seizure of lands owned by white farmers33 and defended the violence
perpetrated against both the white farm owners and their black farm employees. In the wake of these
escalating tactics, the Zimbabwean human rights community has become severely weakened and
fractured.
Mugabe has demonstrated how effective it can be for a government under enormous pressure
to create a climate of intolerance and lawlessness by starting with sexual minorities and working out
from there to the rest of civil society. As Scott Long has observed about various Southern African
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leaders, “the government used the spectre of sexual perversion to discredit the whole of civil society.” 34
Just as “nationalist rhetoric makes ‘women’ the pure and ahistorical signifier of ‘interiority’”35 it
strategically renders sexual pervert as the ur subject of exteriority. While “‘woman’ becomes the mute
but necessary allegorical ground for the transactions of nationalist history,”36 gayness comes into focus
not as ground but as figure - as other - whose assimilation into the whole is regard as a threat to the
nation.
In Zimbabwe, the state has gained an official sexuality free from colonial contamination, threats
to the ruling regime have become sexualized, and sexual discipline is revealed to be a very effective tool
of governance for a state in dangerous times. All of this has produced a precinct of dissenting sexual
outlaws, congealed into the constituency-based GALZ, whose job it is to give voice to that dissent.

II. The Moral Enclosure of Sexual Threats in Egypt
In May 2001, 52 men in Cairo, Egypt were arrested for suspected consensual same sex sexual
acts. They were tried before an Egyptian Emergency State Security Court on charges of obscene
behavior and contempt for religion, as Egyptian law does not explicitly criminalize homosexual conduct.
The Emergency State Security Courts were created in 1981 after the assassination of President Anwar
Sadat, and since then his successor Hosni Mubarak has ruled under a state of emergency authorizing
34
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suspension of a range of civil and political rights.37
An unprecedented state-sponsored media campaign publicized the arrests and trials of the
accused - their names, places of work and, in some cases, pictures were published in the state owned
media.38 The accused were arrested in the early hours of May 11, 2001, following a raid by police
and State Security Intelligence personnel on a party held aboard the Queen Boat, moored on the Nile
in Cairo’s Zamalek district. Initial reports in the Egyptian media suggested that those arrested were
part of a “Satanic cult” and that they were being held under charges of “exploiting religion to promote
extreme ideas to create strife and belittle the revealed religions.” It subsequently became clear that the
arrests were carried out because the men were suspected of engaging in consensual sexual activity with
other men. The detainees were subjected to forensic examinations, apparently in order to determine
whether they had engaged in anal intercourse.39 In November, 2001, the defendants were brought into
court and were promptly placed in a cage in the courtroom where they stood wearing masks and hoods
they had constructed out of their shirts and underwear in order to disguise their identities from the media
present in the court. Indeed, only the media was allowed in the courtroom when the judge read out the
verdicts and sentences, families and friends of the accused were not permitted to be present, and their
cries from the hall and banging on the courtroom doors rumbled in the courtroom as the judge began
37

Human Rights Watch (October 2001), Egypt: Human Rights Background, available at:
http://www.hrw.org/backgrounder/mena/egypt-bck-1001.htm Human Rights Watch (October 2001).
38

Hossam Bahgat, “Explaining Egypt’s Targeting of Gays,” Middle East Research and
Information Project, Press Information Note 64. (2001), p. 2.
39

International Gay and Lesbian Human Rights Commission, “Action Alert, Egypt: Emergency
Court Trials for Homosexual Suspects,” available at: http://www.iglhrc.org/news/press/pr_010703.html
(2001).
-19-

the proceedings. The judge read the court’s verdict in a whisper that no one in the room could hear,
indeed many defendants did not know whether they had been found guilty or what sentence they had
been given for some days.
In the end, twenty three of the fifty two defendants were sentenced to between one and five
years of hard labor.40 However, in May, 2002 the State Security Office for the Ratification of Verdicts
overturned most of the Cairo 52 convictions and released 21 of the men who had been found guilty of
the “habitual practice of debauchery.” The court took this action on the ground that this crime did not
merit trial before the special emergency court, and ordered that these men, as well as those who had
been acquitted in the Cairo 52 trial, be retried in a civilian court.41
How to understand these very public scandalous show trials undertaken by the Egyptian
government in the press, the Emergency Security Court, and now Egyptian civil courts? As in
Zimbabwe, some have observed that the Mubarak government desired to divert public attention away
from economic problems and a growing liquidity crisis while the government attempted to impose new
sales taxes.42 One could also imagine that the government had ample reason to shore up its Islamic
credentials domestically as it found itself increasingly allied with the U.S. government in its campaign
against terrorism. Scandalous sex trials might do the trick. Some human rights groups have interpreted

40

International Gay and Lesbian Human Rights Commission, “Action Alert, 23 Presumed
Homosexuals Sentenced to Hard Labor,” available at:
http://www.iglhrc.org/world/africa/Egypt2001Nov_2.html (2001).
41

International Gay and Lesbian Human Rights Commission, “Action Alert: Cairo 52 Acquitted
Men Back In Court,” available at: http://www.iglhrc.org/world/africa/Egypt2002Jun_2.html, (2002).
42

Bahgat, “Explaining Egypt’s Targeting of Gays,” p. 2.
-20-

the prosecution of the Cairo 52 as an indicator of how Islamic societies treat sexuality.
Yet it may be that the Cairo 52 case represents something much more complicated that
Mubarak’s attempt to distract his people from domestic economic problems, or an instance of Islamic
sexual repression. Situating this case in the history of both Islam and the legal regulation of sex in
Egypt reveals how the public prosecution, at this moment, of men suspected of homosexual acts
serves the interests of the Egyptian secular government’s post-colonial struggle for independence - in
the face of both domestic and international threats of instability. Indeed, these prosecutions may
advance the Mubarak government’s pattern of repressing islamic activism on the one hand, and
securing the symbolic purity of Egyptian culture on the other.
The laws under which the Cairo 52 were prosecuted find their roots in post-colonial campaigns
against prostitution. Egyptian law does not expressly criminalize homosexual acts. However, the
obscenity charges that were brought against these men came under Article 9(c) of Law No. 10 of 1961
on the Combat of Prostitution. When the British occupied Egypt in 1882, they imposed a form of
“regulationism” of prostitution.43 Rather than outlawing it, which would have comported with Christian
colonial moralizing in evidence elsewhere, the British set out to regulate legalized prostitution - requiring
the registration of prostitutes, weekly medical inspections of sex workers, and restricting the sex trade
to certain licensed establishments.44 In Egypt, as in many other areas colonized during this period,
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prostitution was legalized, in significant part, for the benefit of European settlers and soldiers.45
Dunne’s research shows that the number of registered prostitutes in Cairo jumped from 921 in 1914 to
2,540 in 1915, and then fell off as the war wound down. 46 Legalized and regulated prostitution
remained a vital part of Egyptian urban life through the remainder of British rule, notwithstanding reform
and abolition campaigns undertaken during that same period in Britain and in many of its other colonies.
Egyptian nationalists, however, seized on prostitution immediately after national independence
as an example of the social ills that befell Egypt under British occupation.47 Egyptian Feminist Huda
Sha’rawi declared in the national newspaper L’Egytienne in February of 1925 that the struggle against
licensed brothels was a matter of national honor, and that the abolitionist cause was “patriotic and
humanitarian.”48
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Shortly thereafter, Islamic nationalists began a campaign to link the abolition of prostitution to
Egyptian nationalism and Islam.49 The abolition of prostitution became a principle goal of decolonization, and the ultimate repeal of laws legalizing prostitution after British occupation was explicitly
understood to represent a rejection of the promiscuity of alien sexual culture, and the purging of alien
sex workers from Egypt’s urban spaces.50
Yet the independent Egyptian government did not repeal the British laws licensing prostitution
and regulating brothels until 1949, fully twenty seven years after independence. Some of the delay can
be attributed to the presence of allied troops in Egypt during the Second World War.51 And much time
was devoted to the work of the Commission of Enquiry, charged in 1932 with the task of considering
alternatives to regulated prostitution.52 The Muslim Brotherhood began to play a role in Egyptian
politics in the 1930s, urging a reorientation of the culture in keeping with Islamic principles. Their
influence took hold in the late 1940s and early 1950s. Prime Minister Ibrahim Abdel Hadi Pasha
issued a military decree closing the brothels in 1949, in part in response to criticism the government had
received from the Muslim Brotherhood regarding the government’s policy permitting prostitution,
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gambling and drinking of alcohol.53 Without question, legal reforms during this period were undertaken
for complex sets of reasons, however two important concerns had a significant effect upon the
government’s approach to prostitution after independence: anti-imperialist Egyptian nationalism
articulated as sexual purity, and the secular state defending itself against the growing power of the
Muslim Brotherhood.
These two concerns figure prominently in the prosecution of the Cairo 52 under modern
Egyptian criminal law targeting prostitution. First, the Emergency Security Courts in which these men
were tried were originally set up to try Islamic fundamentalists. Since 1992 hundreds of civilians,
mostly alleged members or supporters of al-Gihad (Holy Struggle, known abroad as Egyptian Islamic
Jihad), al-Gama'a al-Islamiyya (Islamic Group), or the Muslim Brotherhood, have been referred to
military courts. These trials, sometimes held en masse, have been criticized by Human Rights Watch
and other human rights organizations for failing to meet international fair trial standards: basic rights,
such as the right to appeal, have been routinely violated, even in cases where the defendants faced and
were punished with the death penalty.54 The well publicized prosecution of the Cairo 52 in these same
courts sends a message to an international audience that the courts do not exist exclusively to harass
and persecute the religious opposition. Indeed, these courts can be used to prosecute the very groups
that the Islamists hate the most.
What is more, in recent years of national economic contraction, Islamic groups have stepped in
53
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to provide social services previously provided by the Egyptian state. As a result, the Muslim
Brotherhood and similar organizations have gained popularity among the Egyptian people. Although
officially banned by the Egyptian government since 1954, the Muslim Brotherhood has 17 seats in the
Egyptian Parliament, making it the second largest party in the parliament after the ruling National
Democratic Party. 55 Thus, the Mubarak government has ample incentive to undertake a public
campaign to appease the supporters of the Brotherhood, and men accused of homosexuality would
serve well. The government guessed correctly that the Egyptian human rights community would be
reluctant to come to their aid.
What is more, anti-imperialist rhetoric has figured in the Cairo 52 prosecutions just as it did in
the efforts to reform the colonial prostitution laws after independence. This time, the alien sexual culture
to be kept at bay is the “west,” not merely the British. Then as now, “both nationalist and Islamist
discourses have invoked ideals of Islamic morality and cultural authenticity to control and channel
change.”56 As Neville Hoad has pointed out, “Claims of authenticity and/or foreignness take place in an
extremely vexed representational field.”57
Thus, these prosecutions have been useful on a number of grounds: it appears “to be a
calculated gamble by an insecure regime. The crackdown on gays, as diplomats and political analysts
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see it, reflects government concern about growing freedom of expression in Egypt - fueled by the
proliferation of Internet chat rooms and Web sites beyond the regime’s control. The government may
also have contrived the prosecutions to bolster its Islamic credentials at a time when Egyptians are
angered by an imploding economy and the arrests of fundamentalists. The strategy may be working.
Although condemned abroad, the trial of the ‘Cairo 52' has met with nearly universal approval at
home.”58
In Egypt, as in Zimbabwe, the moral enclosure of sex - be it heterosexuality within
monogamous marriage, prostitution or homosex - has proven to be an effective tool of governance by a
state under stress. Prior to the mid-twentieth century, same sex sex between males was well know and
wide spread in Egypt. But only the passive partner (constructed within the context of anal sex) was
considered to be homosexual and was subject to criminal laws prohibiting homosexual acts.59
Curiously, this definition of homosexuality has changed in recent years. Through the Cairo 52
prosecutions, the government has demonstrated the adoption of a more “western” identity-based
definition of gayness. Role no longer defines the crime, sex of object choice does - and this is new in
Muslim society. Thus, at the moment that the Egyptian government has chosen to use (homo)sex to
consolidate and rehabilitate its power, it has done so by first interpellating a western homosexual
subject, and then caging him, parading him before the public, and excising him from Egyptian culture.
The moral enclosure in which these gay outlaws in Egypt have been caged reflects a kind of
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territorialization, or social mapping by a governmental power on the sexualized body.
Here, as in Zimbabwe, “internal enemies” have been located within the political horizon of the
state - not from without as would have been the case with foreign prostitutes or residual colonialists.
So too, sexual accusation has supplied the mechanism of justification by which qualities deemed
undesirable may be contained or excised. These domestic enemies emerge first as an abstract legal
category “the sodomite” or “the pervert habituated to debauchery,” that is to be filled up with bodies really, any bodies - through an act of nominal violence with profound epistemic effects. “You, and you
and you,” commands the state as it arrests Egyptian men60 off the street, often randomly. Through
these public acts of law enforcement, sex is stamped on male bodies in an act whereby qualities
deemed undesirable may be contained or excised through sexual accusation by the post colonial state in
its attempts to define an idealized nation.61

III. Disciplinary Administration of African American Sexual Citizenship in the post
Civil War South
The period in which African Americans entered the U.S. civil polity as citizens was, most
assuredly, among the most complex periods of state (re)formation in the nation’s history. The
enumeration and enforcement of civil rights for freed men and women, beginning with the Civil Rights
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Act of 1866,62 played a central role in the creation of legal and political identities for African American
people. But these political identities—as freedpeople—were not self-executing upon the ratification of
the Thirteenth or Fourteenth Amendments. Rather, African Americans’ status as citizens was an
identity to be managed by various public and private actors in the immediate postbellum period. “Being
a free citizen, he must act as one, carrying the burdens, if he so considers them, as well as enjoying the
privileges of his new condition,”63 cautioned the chief judge of the Georgia Supreme Court in 1881.
Similarly, Freedmen’s Bureau agents were “instructed to act as General Counsellors for the Freedpeople within their respective districts, and to give them such advice as will tend most to their ultimate
good, and make them honest and upright citizens.”64 As I have discussed elsewhere, conformance with
late-nineteenth-century marital norms was regarded by both Freedmen’s Bureau agents and local
Southern officials as one of the principal ways in which the freed men and women could be civilized and
prepared for the demands of citizenship.65
Thus, for African Americans in this era, the transition from enslavement to freedom and
citizenship meant a shift in the domain of personal governance, from that of an owner to that of statemonitored self governance. Indeed, rather than securing a domain of autonomy and freedom from
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government regulation, inclusion into the domain of rights as citizens signified a “politico-ethical project
of producing subjects and governing their conduct.”66 What form did this take for African Americans in
the postbellum era? How was sexuality part of this politico-ethical project?
As Union troops moved through the South, enslaved people fled their owners for the safety of
the Northern army’s encampments, seeking safety, food and shelter. Quickly overwhelmed by the
numbers and needs of the black people seeking aid, the U.S. government quickly set up refugee camps,
or “contraband camps” as they were called at the time,67 in order to gain their liberty and the protection
of Northern troops.68 The destitution, disease, and need of these people, freed by circumstance, was
overwhelming. Henry Rowntree, a representative of the federal agency hastily formed to address the
needs of indigent black people, described the living conditions of various freedpeople at Vicksburg,
Mississippi, in the spring of 1864 as follows:
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I called at a cattle shed without any siding, there huddled together were 35 poor wretchedly
helpless negros, one man who had lost one eye entirely, and the sight of the other fast going, he
could do nothing.
Five women all Mothers, and the residue of 29 children, all small and under 12 years of age.
One of the Women had the small pox, her face a perfect mass of Scabs, her children were left
uncared for except for what they incidentally [received]. Another woman was nursing a little
boy about 7 whose earthly life was fast ebbing away, she could pay but little attention to the
rest of her family. Another was scarcely able to crawl about.
They had no bedding. Two old quilts and a soldiers old worn out blanket comprised the whole
for 35 human beings. I enquired how they slept, they collect together to keep one another
warm and then throw the quilts over them. There is no wood for them nearer than half a mile
which these poor children have to toat as they could carry, hence they have a poor supply and
the same with water, this has be carried the same distance and the only vessel they had to carry
it in was a heavy 2 gallon stone jug, a load for a child when empty.
They owned One Pan, and one Iron kettle amongst them, they had no tin cup, no crockery of
any kind, no knives or forks, and certainly were the poorest off, of any I have met with being
litterally and truthfully destitute in every sense of the word.69
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This description was not atypical of the living conditions of the formally enslaved people who
had escaped behind Union lines.
As the federal government deliberated over how to handle the sizable population of freed men
and women, virtually all of whom were in desperate need of material aid, a key decision was made with
respect to meeting that need. The needs of freed men and women, as well as the structure for their
transition from enslavement to citizen, would be met not by providing them with material resources
(such as land, food, or reparations), but by providing them with rights. In the end, law not land is what
U.S. government felt the freedmen needed most. And that’s what they got - lots of it. “Freedom”
delivered cold comfort to those formerly enslaved people who sought the aid of federal officers at the
end of the war.
Thus legal status, not material resources, was used to address the transition from enslavement to
freedom for African American people. In this case, rights operated not only as the frame within which
freed men and women were to exercise their new-found freedom, but also as a political horizon: “the
just society.” The Bureau Agents were there to define what these rights meant, and what obligations
they imposed on freed men and women.
In the face of the overwhelming human suffering, illness and desperation that African American
people presented when they sought refuge in contraband camps, Northern officials’ first response was
not to deliver food and shelter, but to insist that all adult couples be married, and that traditional family
groupings be formed before anyone could gain entrance to the camps. In April 1863, Eaton reported
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that "all entering our camps who have been living or desire to live together as husband and wife are
required to be married in the proper manner . . . . This regulation has done much to promote the good
order of the camp."70 In March 1864, the Secretary of War made Eaton's regulation official United
States policy, and ordered Freedmen's Bureau agents to "solemnize the rite of marriage among
Freedmen."71 Thereafter, superintendents of the contraband camps uniformly reported that "the
introduction of the rite of christian marriage and requiring its strict observance, exerted a most
wholesome influence upon the order of the camps and the conduct of the people."72
Wholesomeness was not the only salutary consequence intended by the Freedmen’s Bureau’s
marriage policy. Many Bureau officers expressed the widespread view that the transition from slave to
citizen would require African Americans to internalize self discipline and self governance for which they
had never before demonstrated a capacity. 73 In hearings before the American Freedmen's Inquiry
Commission--the federal commission created in 1863 to suggest methods for dealing with the
emancipated slaves--Colonel William Pile, the administrator of the Vicksburg, Mississippi, contraband
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camp, testified to the Commission that
[o]ne great defect in the management of the negroes down there was, as I judged, the ignoring
of the family relationship . . . . My judgement is that one of the first things to be done with these
people, to qualify them for citizenship, for self-protection and self-support, is to impress upon
them the family obligations.74
Sexual discipline - communicated to Freed men and women as the celebrated right to marry played a role in the governance of these new political subjects in ways that echo David Scott’s
observations about colonial governmentality in South Asia at roughly the same time. For African
Americans in the U.S. the right to choose a sexual partner (only one at a time!) and the concomitant
right to marry that partner, opened up “a new social and legal space for the desiring subject ... through
the construction of a notion of rights, [colonial power] shift[ed] the site of agency such that it now came
to be assigned to the private sphere of an individuality regulated not by the personal discretionary
demands of a sovereign extracting tribute [or a slave master] but by the internal volitional agency of a
rational free will.” In colonial Sri Lanka, as well as the post bellum U.S. South, the new order
“required that new habits of social discipline be acquired by the native population.”75 Thus we witness
John Eaton instructing federal officials running the contraband camps: "Among the things to be done, to
fit the freed people for a life of happiness and usefulness, it was obvious that the inculcation of right
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principles and practices in regard to the social relations ought to find a place."76 African American
(hetero)sexuality thus became a focal point for their patrons from the North in a civilizing mission aimed
at guiding them along path from slave to citizen. Rights made up one of the principle paving stones
along this route,77 although surely the freed men and women would have preferred something more
sturdy, like land and a mule, beneath their feet.
Governance by the state and self governance by the individual became possible, in significant
respects, by and through the institution of marriage. It created an intelligible domain within which
governable subjects were called up - husbands and wives, but also adulterers, fornicators and bigamist.
Husbands bore economic responsibility for their families,78 thus privatizing dependency and relieving the
state of responsibility for the freedmen’s destitution. As Nancy Cott observes of this period, "[h]aving
and supporting dependents was evidence of independence."79 So too, aggressive enforcement of
bigamy, adultery and fornication laws against those who failed at this project of self-governance, filled
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southern state prisons with black male bodies who could be leased out to white planters at rock bottom
prices in order to perform the agricultural work previously performed by slaves.80 This is what freedom
looked like for many black men in the post bellum south: performing the same work for the same white
landowner as you had while enslaved, but as a fungible leased resource rather than a prized owned
asset.81
Of course, it would be naive to understand state power in a context such as this as acting upon
an undifferentiated mass of natives who are domesticated through a simple Althusserian form of call and
response: the law beckons and you either answer the call as husband or wife, or refuse it at the price of
prosecution for fornication or bigamy. Either way the law wins under this account, and the native is
acted on as the object of the state’s disciplinary power.
In the post bellum period, as in most other colonial encounters, the domesticating power of law
renders agency and resistence a much more complicated story. Imperialist power is working at its best
when the native is domesticated by internalizing, or self-inscribing imperialist scripts and legal norms
such that the object of imperial control becomes subject to its own self-discipline.82 Colonialism’s
power to cultivate self-governance in those to be governed takes place through a set of tactics of
inscription that bring into existence the kind of social and legal subjects over which the state seeks to
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command control, such as husbands, wives and fornicators.83
The evidence contained in the original indictments and prosecutions of African Americans in the
immediate post bellum period indicate that criminal discipline imposed for violations of marriage laws, in
many cases, were not initiated by white Northerners, or, for that matter, white Southerners. Rather,
adultery, bigamy and fornication laws were being enforced largely from within the African American
community. In Mississippi, for instance, quite often the indictment and accusatory affidavits were
initiated by African American women against their husbands who had taken up with someone else. In
Granville County, North Carolina, there was a spate of prosecutions against African American couples
for fornication and adultery, and the principle witnesses on all the indictments were Willis and Chaney
Chandler, a black couple who, census data reveals, were neighbors of the people they turned in to the
authorities for living in sin. However, 9 months later, Willis and Chaney were turned over to the local
prosecutor by their neighbors for fornication - it seems they too were not legally married.
The women of Granville County also made extraordinary use of a legal procedure relating to
bastardy. If a woman was not married to the father of her child, she could go to court and get an order
naming him as the legal father, and then, ideally, obtain a court order of child support. Typically, the
order of paternity would issue on the word of the woman alone. The Granville County records show
such a large number of bastardy petitions filed by women, mostly black women, that at one point they
opened up a special bastardy court that met on Saturdays and heard only these petitions. Curiously,
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however, very few of the cases resulted in an award of support – by and large the men were never
served nor appeared in court as they had most likely left the county when they heard that their names
appeared on a warrant. Notwithstanding the fact that these petitions resulted in very few orders of
paternity or awards of child support, women continued to file them in great numbers – and the only
significant legal or material consequence was that a legal document had been filed in court in which the
women had admitted that their children were bastards.
How are we to understand the legal subjectivity of African American’s when they go down to
City Hall to register their marriages, turn to the local sheriff to prosecute their husbands for adultery, or
file bastardy petitions against the fathers of their children? What sort of epistemic overhaul does this
transition from enslavement to freedom signify? Are they social protagonists, or “good blacks” whose
conformance to Reconstruction expectations of citizenship marks out a zone between those who are
passing as citizens and those who aren’t? Is there any room for agency in this account of citizenship,
rights and interpellation? Can we understand African American’s use of rights as a kind of mimicry or
pastiche, the contains, or better yet, reveals within it a resisting subject?
There may be a plausible way to understand African American’s resort to law and rights as
something other than passive interpellation. In this sense, Homi Bahbha’s notion of ambivalency is
helpful - for the role of law is not only the imposition of the rule of law, for surely it was resorted to
strategically by freed men and women in this period. While we can’t know this for sure, I have a very
strong suspicion that a good number of the women in Vicksburg, Mississippi who resorted to legal
authorities to get their husbands back in the house were doing so in order to avoid having their children
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apprenticed out to their former owners.84 As single parents, they were more likely to be found
unsuitable providers for their children’s needs, and therefore sought to get their male partners back in
the house so that his income could be deemed available for the children’s support.
Explaining the bastardy petitions is a bit more difficult. Given that there were so many of them
filed, and that so few of them resulted in actual cash payments for child support, I suspect that one of
the Northern Benevolent Aid societies conditioned the award of cash grants to needy children and
mothers upon the respectability of the mother. The filing of bastardy petitions might have been
incentivized by this private welfare regime. That is, complying with a legal ritual, even if it were nothing
more than a formality, may have been enough to demonstrate the fact that the woman and her children
were deserving according to the Protestant norms at work in Boston.
Thus, for freed men and women, marriage was constructed by the state as a site of freedom, a
legally defined space in which legally defined subjects could exercise rights. Thus African Americans
were caught in the double bind of freedom that Saidiya Hartman has termed “burdened individuality,”
whereby the granting of social and legal rights “resulted in the paradoxical construction of the freed both
as self-determining and enormously burdened individuals and as members of a population whose
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productivity, procreation, and sexual practices were fiercely regulated and policed.”85 Here as
elsewhere, Eve Sedgwick has likely provided a productive way to think about the rule of law and the
role of law in freed men and women’s lives: kinda subversive, kinda hegemonic.86
From the state’s perspective, however, the granting of marriage rights to African Americans in
this period was part of a kind of political rationality that sought to produce a set of governing-effects
largely grounded in a notion of habituating the freedmen to a project of self improvement and self
governance. This kind of governance emanates not from violent or coercive acts by a primitive state on
a passive body to be governed, but as an activity or practice that regulates the “conduct of conduct,”
that sets up a field of action for the governed.87 The institutions of civil society, most prominently the
family, should not, therefore, be understood as the binary opposite of the domain of the state, but rather
are constructed as sites where social and civil subjects are called up in ways that can be organized and
reorganized in ways that are useful to the state. These terrains are bounded by notions of freedom,
consent and self-governance, and they oblige certain forms of conduct and forms of life to emerge. The
glory of this form of governmentality is that the forms of conduct and life that are brought into being take
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place in “moral enclosures” that are understood to be expressions of individual freedom, consent and
self-governance, not state coercion or violence.88
Marriage and the family, thus understood, were useful terrains on which to control and
manage African Americans in the post civil war era. The freedom that the right to marry
operationalized required them to internalize certain forms of sexual discipline and self government.
Indeed, freedom itself was made manifest in compliance with the disciplinary demands of marriage.
Thus, the political subject - the citizen - was the compliant freed man or woman who stood in
contradistinction to the noncompliant legal subject - the fornicator, the adulterer, the bigamist. Here, as
in the examples above, the interests of the many - the citizenry - took aim at the interests of the singular
- the outlaw. Those who failed the tests that the inauguration of rights-bearing subjectivity implied
found themselves on the opposite side of a fundamental political divide that had an explicit civilizing
mission. Savage or citizen, the choice was the Freedmen’s to make.
Those who failed the test because they clung to a different notion of what it meant to enjoy
autonomy and liberty in one’s intimate relations, found themselves legally caged (or chained in this case)
as dissenters from a norm to which they had chosen not to conform. Agency and discipline thus came
packaged together in an era that made “unconventional sex a national threat and thus put a premium on
managed sexuality for the health of the state.”89
While the post-war U.S. government could have undertaken this project of freedom,
submission and citizenship in a variety of ways, sexual discipline within the terrain of monogamous
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marriage was the first tactic they turned to. From the moment black people fled to the contraband
camps, to the granting of the right to marry immediately after legal emancipation, to the prosecution of
African American men for fornication and adultery, the regulation of African American sexuality and the
performance of sexual discipline and self governance proved quite useful techniques of governance for
the post bellum state. In this context, the regulation of sex proved to be of great service to both the
practices of individual freedom and the practices of national reunification. As the U.S. government
faced overwhelming challenges in bringing under its control the errant South as well as hundreds of
thousands of freed men and women, sexual discipline and its structural frame - marriage - emerged
quite quickly as an effective tool by which to manage this latter group.

Conclusion
I offer these three examples to show how in some circumstances it has proven useful to
construct a narrative about the nation that contains an official national sexuality, and a nation that is
populated by certain types of sexualized subjects and citizens. These examples illustrate how sexuality
can help define political culture, and that certain forms of nationalism are operationalized through the
management of threats that are easily imagined in sexualized terms. The epistemic violence of rule
during dangerous times can be most effective when done through and by sex and sexuality.
The sexual accusation cultivated by the post colonial nationalism in evidence in Zimbabwe and
Egypt reflects what might be understood as a form of reverse or internalized Orientalism. In both
cases, the “object” of post colonial nationalist thought remains the Oriental, who “accepts and adopts
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the same essentialist conception based on the distinction between ‘the East’ and ‘the West’.”90 In this
post colonial context, the repressive resolution of identity is accomplished by framing local enemies that
bear a metonymic relationship to the “West.” At least in the instances I examine in this essay, gays or
perverts are interpellated through various legal techniques as new subalterns, produced as an effect of
nationalist rhetoric. This sexualized threats then congeals in a certain kind of subjectivity that reads
politically and socially as dissenting Others.
In all three examples, the dissenting, sexualized subject emerges from within the political and
legal horizon created by the state. Thus, their origins and their social utility look quite different from that
of the “ordinary” political dissenter.
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